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SEEKING A UNIFIED FIELD OF CLIMATE 
FINANCE 
David P. Cluchey* 
CLIMATE FINANCE:  REGULATORY AND FUNDING STRATEGIES FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT.  EDITED BY RICHARD 
B. STEWART, BENEDICT KINGSBURY, & BRYCE RUDYK.  NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY PRESS.  2009. 
The collection of essays on climate change, edited by Richard 
Stewart, Benedict Kingsbury, and Bryce Rudyk, takes on the ambitious 
goal of constructing “a unified field of climate finance from a very 
diverse body of practice and ideas.”1  While it does not entirely achieve 
this goal, this volume, with its thirty-five essays and a comprehensive 
introductory chapter by the three editors, makes a useful contribution to 
the literature in the field.  Given the brevity of the essays (other than the 
introduction, none exceeds ten pages and most are significantly shorter) 
the book is particularly helpful for the reader looking for a broad but 
sophisticated overview of a multi-faceted topic with a wide variety of 
complex sub-issues. 
The process of creating programs to reduce the levels of greenhouse 
gases released into the atmosphere has evolved since the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change entered into force in 1994.2  
The steps taken in the Kyoto Protocol of 1998 reflected promise,3 but the 
results of last December’s conference in Copenhagen were 
disappointing.4  The preliminary versions of the essays in Climate 
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 1. CLIMATE FINANCE:  REGULATORY AND FUNDING STRATEGIES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT xii (Richard B. Stewart, Benedict Kingsbury, & Bryce 
Rudyk eds., 2009) [hereinafter CLIMATE FINANCE]. 
 2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, March 21, 1994, 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
 3. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
December 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
 4. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Many Goals Remain Unmet in 5 Nations’ Climate Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/12/19/science/earth/19climate.html; John Vidal, Allegra Stratton and Suzanne 
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Finance were presented at a conference in Abu Dhabi in May of 2009 
and the final versions of the essays were published promptly thereafter 
(September 2009).  The timing of the conference and the publication 
appears to be directly related to influencing the planned climate summit 
in Copenhagen in December, 2009.  Climate Finance is not a traditional 
academic treatment of the issues discussed in its essays, but rather a 
reflection of the origin of the essays in conference presentations with an 
apparent objective of short-term impact on climate policy discussions at 
the Copenhagen Summit.  
Stewart, Kingsbury, and Ryduk have a general sense of what they 
believe would constitute an effective and politically-viable financial 
strategy for promoting climate mitigation.  In their introduction they 
identify three factors which they describe as the “key determinants” of 
climate finance.5  The first, and most significant, of these factors is 
“climate science imperatives.”6  However, this is not a book about 
climate science and the editors dispense with this factor in a paragraph 
and devote only a single essay to it.7  Although there remains scattered 
controversy about the causes and the extent of climate change, 
Oppenheimer’s essay presents the consensus case for the very serious 
implications of failing to respond promptly and effectively to the 
problem of global warming and it does so concisely and compellingly. 
The real concerns of the editors are the other two factors they 
identify as key to climate finance, financing needs and mitigation 
opportunities, and the political economy of climate policy.8  These two 
factors, broadly conceived, are the focus of most of the essays in this 
book. 
Climate Finance is divided into six parts.  The first part, “Climate 
Mitigation:  Overview and Key Themes”, includes the introduction by 
the editors and essays on climate change,9 funds needed for mitigation of 
                                                                                                  
Goldenberg, Low targets, goals dropped:  Copenhagen ends in failure, THE GUARDIAN, 
Dec. 19, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/ 
dec/18/copenhagen-deal. 
 5. Richard B. Stewart, Benedict Kingsbury, & Bryce Rudyk, Climate Finance for 
Limiting Emissions and Promoting Green Development, in CLIMATE FINANCE 4. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Michael Oppenheimer, Understanding the Causes and Implications of Climate 
Change, in CLIMATE FINANCE 35-41. 
 8. Stewart, Kingsbury, & Ryduk, supra note 5, at 4-6. 
 9. See Oppenheimer, supra note 7. 
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climate change,10 and the need for a “more flexible architecture” for 
climate finance.11  The authors of each of these essays are respected 
experts, two of them are academics and the third has served in both the 
government and non-government organization sectors.  These essays lay 
the foundation for the approaches and mechanisms suggested in later 
essays. 
Part II of the book is the longest section (at almost 100 pages) and is 
focused on recommendations for reform of financing mechanisms.  In 
the first of these essays, the author, associated with the Environmental 
Defense Fund, makes the case for the use of cap and trade mechanisms 
over the alternative of a carbon tax.12  This is the only essay directly 
dealing with this issue and the resolution of the debate in favor of cap 
and trade is consistent with the editors’ view of the issue.13  The only 
other discussion of the issue is found in a later essay in another section of 
the book, suggesting possible advantages of the carbon tax approach.14  It 
is clear that the editors have decided not to elaborate on the debate 
between cap and trade and carbon tax approaches and the remainder of 
the essays are largely focused on specific issues relating to the cap and 
trade mechanism.  Nonetheless, a more extensive acknowledgement of 
the cap and trade/carbon tax controversy and a more balanced treatment 
of the debate would have been a useful addition to the book. 
The other essays in Part II discuss a variety of important topics 
relating to the structure of mitigation programs.  There is a single essay 
on the reform of the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM).15  The CDM is an effort to encourage developed countries to 
meet their mitigation commitments, in part, by funding clean energy and 
mitigation schemes in developing countries.  While it is acknowledged 
                                            
 10. Bert Metz, The Climate Financing Problem:  Funds Needed for Global Climate 
Change Mitigation Vastly Exceed Funds Currently Available, in CLIMATE FINANCE 42-
47. 
 11. Daniel Bodansky, The Future of Climate Governance: Creating a More Flexible 
Architecture, in CLIMATE FINANCE 48-52. 
 12. Nathaniel O. Keohane, Cap-and-Trade is Preferable to a Carbon Tax, in CLIMATE 
FINANCE 57-64. 
 13. Stewart, Kingsbury, & Ryduk, supra note 5, at 8.  
 14. Lily Batchelder, Fiscal Considerations in Curbing Climate Change, in CLIMATE 
FINANCE 291-99.  Professor Batchelder suggests, among other issues, that given the 
regressive effect of climate change mitigation measures, the need for additional revenue 
to ameliorate the effect of these measures on the less well-off members of society might 
be more likely met by a carbon tax.  Id. at 291. 
 15. Charlotte Streck, Expectations and Reality of the Clean Development Mechanism: 
A Climate Finance Instrument between Accusation and Aspiration, in CLIMATE FINANCE 
67-75. 
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that the CDM has cut the costs of compliance for some developed 
countries, its contribution to sustainable and efficient development is 
debated.16  Several essays discuss the importance of sectoral focus in any 
financing mechanism, with particular emphasis on forest and land use 
programs in the developing world.17  Two essays discuss leveraging 
trading to generate additional funds for mitigation programs, reflecting 
the concern that trading alone will not provide sufficient funds to meet 
mitigation goals.18  There is an essay on the importance of linking trading 
systems19 and several on the role of private investment in cap and trade 
markets and the perspectives of private investors.20   
In contrast to Part II, which examines the details of structuring the 
market mechanisms for dealing with mitigation investments, Parts III and 
V of Climate Finance are concerned with two very broad issues essential 
to the success of any multilateral mitigation initiative.  Part III focuses on 
the current disconnect between developed and developing countries and 
discusses approaches which might help allay the concerns of developing 
countries and ensure their active participation in the climate change 
mitigation process.  Part V explores the relationship between climate 
mitigation and finance issues and trade regulation under the auspices of 
the WTO.   
The essay by Ghosh and Woods in Part III21 starkly lays out the level 
of distrust between the developed and the developing countries in the 
negotiations on climate mitigation.  This distrust is the culmination of 
many years of failure of communication and understanding on a wide 
                                            
 16. Id. at 69-71. 
 17. Murray Ward, Why a Successful Climate Change Agreement Needs Sectoral 
Elements, in CLIMATE FINANCE 79-84; Ruben Kraiem, Sectoral Crediting: Getting the 
Incentives Right for Private Investors, in CLIMATE FINANCE 85-89; Eric C. Bettelheim, 
Forest and Land Use Programs Must Be Given Financial Credit in Any Climate Change 
Agreement, in CLIMATE FINANCE 90-95; Israil Klabin, Stock-and-Flow Mechanisms to 
Reduce Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry Emissions: A Proposal from Brazil,  
in CLIMATE FINANCE 96-101. 
 18. Bert Metz, Mitigating Climate Change at Manageable Cost: The Catalyst 
Proposal, in CLIMATE FINANCE 105-10; Annie Petsonk et al., Engaging Developing 
Countries by Incentivizing Early Action, in CLIMATE FINANCE 111-21.  
 19. Henry Derwent, Carbon Market Design: Beyond the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme, in CLIMATE FINANCE 125-31. 
 20. Marcel Brinkman, Incentivizing Private Investment in Climate Change Mitigation, 
in CLIMATE FINANCE 135-42; Nick Robins and Mark Fulton, Investment Opportunities 
and Catalysts: Analysis and Proposals from the Climate Finance Industry on Funding 
Climate Mitigation, in CLIMATE FINANCE 143-51. 
 21. Arunabha Ghosh & Ngaire Woods, Developing Country Concerns about Climate 
Finance Proposals Priorities, Trust, and the Credible Donor Problem, in CLIMATE 
FINANCE 157-164. 
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range of issues.22  There is skepticism among the developing nations 
toward the Bretton Woods institutions, i.e. the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, based in part on the disproportionate voting 
power of the developed countries in these institutions.23  This skepticism 
extends also to the World Trade Organization where the developing 
country members have been dissatisfied with the implementation of a 
variety of Uruguay Round Agreements, particularly those in agriculture 
and intellectual property.24  The authors point out that this distrust makes 
reliance on the Bretton Woods institutions to manage climate finance 
programs or as conduits for financial support of mitigation efforts in 
developing countries problematic.25 
The essential disagreement between the developed and developing 
countries in the area of climate mitigation is the question of who will 
bear the costs (both out-of-pocket and in foregone development) incurred 
by the developing countries in mitigating emissions.  Ghosh and Woods 
suggest three steps that could be taken to help build trust among the 
developing nations: 
1. Ensure the Creation of a Secure Pool of Climate Finance. 
2. Use (or Build) Trusted Institutions for Decision making and 
Disbursement of Finance. 
3. Develop Effective Monitoring, Verification, and Compliance 
Mechanisms for Financing and Technology Transfer 
Commitments.26 
These suggestions have, thus far, not found resonance among 
developed nations who would prefer to limit their investment in 
developing country mitigation efforts and to manage the financial 
commitments they have made through multilateral institutions with 
which they have long experience, i.e. the Bretton Woods institutions.  
The main point of the Ghosh and Woods essay, that a multilateral 
commitment by the developing countries to climate mitigation will only 
follow from serious negotiations and commitments by the developed 
nations, is well taken.  Ultimately, the developed nations will have to 
respond to this position if they wish to achieve significant multilateral 
climate mitigation cooperation.   
                                            
 22. See generally, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002). 
 23. Id. at 12, 224-27.  See generally, Stephen Zamora, Voting in International 
Economic Organizations, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 566 (1980). 
 24. STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 7-8, 245-46. 
 25. Ghosh & Woods, supra note 21, at 161-62. 
 26. Id. at 160-63. 
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The other essays in Part III discuss specific issues related to the 
ongoing disconnect between the developing and developed countries, 
including an interesting proposal by the Korean Ambassador for Climate 
Change to move to a so-called “bottom-up regime” that focuses on 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) reflecting the 
voluntary choices of individual countries on appropriate approaches to 
mitigation.27  Three of the essays deal with conditionality, reflecting the 
reality that the developed countries are unlikely to provide significant 
amounts of funding for climate mitigation to developing countries 
without attaching conditions to the use of money and requiring the 
achievement of mitigation objectives.28  Overall, Part III is an excellent 
treatment of the obstacles to be overcome to ensure the future 
involvement of developing countries in the multilateral climate 
mitigation process. 
The relationship between trade and climate finance, dealt with in Part 
V of Climate Finance, is a complicated one.29  The concern that 
environmental regulations can be used to advance protectionist goals is 
serious and has been the subject of previous multilateral trade 
negotiations.30  On the other hand, environmental regulation is an 
important task of government and the original General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) recognized environmental and conservation 
exceptions to the strict application of trade rules.31   
                                            
 27. Rae Kwon Chung, Operationalizing a Bottom-Up Regime: Registering and 
Crediting NAMAs, in CLIMATE FINANCE 179-85. 
 28. Jacob Werksman, From Coercive Conditionality to Agreed Conditions: The Only 
Future for Future Climate Finance, in CLIMATE FINANCE 189-96; Kevin E. Davis & 
Sarah Dadush, Getting Climate-Related Conditionality Right, in CLIMATE FINANCE 197-
205; Ngaire Woods, Making Climate Finance Work: What Might Climate Change 
Experts Learn from the Experience of Development Assistance?, in CLIMATE FINANCE 
206-10. 
 29. For a more detailed treatment, see GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, STEVE CHARNOVITZ & 
JISUN KIM, GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Peterson Institute for 
International Economics 2009). 
 30. See RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO 
SYSTEM, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW § 1-6(b) (LEXIS Law Publishing 1998).  
The Uruguay Round Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade and on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures can be found at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited June 3, 2010). 
 31. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), Article XX (b) (excepting 
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”) and (g) (“relating 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources…”), 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
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A number of important issues on the relationship of trade law to 
climate finance are explored in six essays in Climate Finance.32  
Particularly interesting is Border Climate Adjustment as Climate Policy 
by Alexandra Khrebtukova, discussing the potential and the legality of 
the imposition of carbon tariffs reflecting the climate impact of imported 
goods.33 
Part IV of Climate Finance examines specific national experiences 
related to climate mitigation and the lessons to be taken from those 
experiences.  Three of these essays focus on the climate policies of, 
respectively, the United States, the European Union, and China.34  The 
essay on the U.S. situation, by Nathaniel O. Keohane (Director of 
Economic Policy and Analysis at the Environmental Defense Fund), 
outlines the provisions of the Waxman-Markey bill passed by the U.S. 
House of Representatives in June, 2009.35  While the ambitious approach 
taken by this bill is laudable (e.g., 83% decrease in 2005 greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050), Congressional action this year on a comprehensive 
approach to decreasing greenhouse gas emissions now seems unlikely.36  
When action is finally taken by the U.S. Congress, it is likely to be 
somewhat less ambitious than the Waxman-Markey bill.  Although the 
                                            
 32. Gabrielle Marceau, The WTO and Climate Finance:  Overview of the Key Issues, 
in CLIMATE FINANCE 247-53; Robert Howse & Antonia Eliason, Carbon Trading and the 
CDM in WTO Law, in CLIMATE FINANCE 254-58; Robert Howse and Antonia Eliason, 
Countervailing Duties and subsidies for Climate Mitigation: What Is, and What Is Not, 
WTO-Compatible?, in CLIMATE FINANCE 259-65; Alexandra Khrebtukova, Border 
Climate Adjustment as Climate Policy, in CLIMATE FINANCE 266-71; Arunabha Ghosh, 
Enforcing Climate Rules with Trade Measures: Five Recommendations for Trade Policy 
Monitoring, in CLIMATE FINANCE 272-80; Sandra G. Mayson, Carbon Footprint Labeling 
in Climate Finance: Governance and Trade Challenges of Calculating Products’ Carbon 
Content, in CLIMATE FINANCE 281-87. 
 33. See Khrebtukova, supra note 32.  Other commentators have endorsed the idea of a 
carbon tax imposed at the border as an equalizer in imposing climate mitigation costs on 
producers from nations that have not pursued equivalent mitigation efforts.  See e.g., Paul 
Krugman, Building a Green Economy, N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 2010, at MM34, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/magazine/11Economy-t.html.  
 34. Nathaniel O. Keohane, Climate Legislation in the United States: Potential 
Framework and Prospects for International Carbon Finance, in CLIMATE FINANCE 213-
20; James Chapman, The EU ETS: Experience to Date and Lessons for the Future, in  
CLIMATE FINANCE 221-27; Jie Yu, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Measures 
in China, in CLIMATE FINANCE 228-33. 
 35. Keohane, supra note 34. 
 36. See, e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Graham Says He Could Vote for Climate Bill, but 
Oil Spill Requires  a ‘Time-Out’, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
cwire/2010/05/07/07climatewire-graham-says-he-could-vote-for-climate-bill-b-
10855.html. 
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review of the bill was helpful in the timeframe it was written, the run-up 
to the Copenhagen Summit, an essay providing a more general 
discussion of the various factors which will influence the ultimate 
version of U.S. legislation would have been more broadly useful.      
The detailed review of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) in 
James Chapman’s essay is particularly impressive.37  It chronicles and 
reports on the results to date of a successful cap and trade approach to 
limiting greenhouse gas emissions.  It also describes ways in which the 
EU approach could be linked to other similar systems and includes EU 
suggestions for dealing with the issue of including developing countries 
in multilateral climate mitigation efforts.  Overall, it accomplishes its 
objective of setting out a concise and informative summary of EU 
progress in limiting greenhouse gas emissions. 
The essay on China, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation 
Measures in China, acknowledges China’s unwillingness to commit to 
binding emissions caps, but defends China’s investment in emission 
reduction programs and discusses China’s growing focus on sustainable 
technology as part of its economic growth strategy.38  The author argues 
that China’s effort to reduce energy consumption per capita and in 
selected industrial and electric power sectors will result in China 
achieving reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that will, within five 
years, match the reductions agreed to by Annex I nations under the 
Kyoto Protocol.  If this prediction is accurate, it is good news indeed.  
The final part of the book, Part VI, entitled “Taxation of Carbon 
Markets,” appears almost as an afterthought, though it raises very 
important concerns for climate finance.  Decisions on taxation create 
incentives and disincentives that must be understood to avoid unintended 
consequences.  Professor Lily Batchelder’s essay, Fiscal Considerations 
in Curbing Climate Change, is an excellent review of key fiscal issues 
generated by both a cap-and-trade schemes and carbon taxes.39  Professor 
Batchelder notes that climate mitigation programs tend to be regressive 
with a disproportionate financial burden placed on lower income citizens.  
She suggests approaches that will mitigate the regressive effect of costs 
imposed to curb emissions, noting the revenue raising advantages of 
carbon taxes and the risk of inequities and inefficiencies from the 
distribution of free emission permits.  Her treatment of the issue, while 
concise, is sophisticated and useful. 
                                            
 37. See Chapman, supra note 34. 
 38. See Yu, supra note 34. 
 39. See Lily Bat Batchelder, Fiscal Considerations in Curbing Climate Change, in 
CLIMATE FINANCE 291-99. 
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Professor Yoram Margalioth discusses the tax treatment of cap-and-
trade permits in Tax Consequences of Carbon Cap-and-Trade Schemes.40  
In a very clearly written and concise essay, he surveys a number of 
complex issues generated by different approaches to the taxation of 
emission permits.  He identifies a series of potential distortions and 
disincentives as well as gaming risks and offers suggestions for avoiding 
them.  As with Professor Batchelder’s essay, his sophisticated treatment 
of the issues will be helpful to any policymaker contemplating the 
structure of a cap-and-trade scheme.  
Overall, Climate Finance is well-conceived and well-executed.  It 
appears to have had limited success in its implicit objective of 
influencing the Copenhagen Summit on climate change.  It does, 
however, provide a useful catalogue of issues that must be resolved 
before a successful multilateral initiative can be fashioned to deal with 
emissions caps and a trading system for those caps.  A number of the 
essays in the book also suggest sophisticated solutions to the resolution 
of some of those issues.  This gives the book continuing importance in 
the debate about climate mitigation and the mechanisms necessary to 
finance it. 
                                            
 40. See Yoram Margalioth, Tax Consequences of Carbon Cap-and-Trade Schemes, in 
CLIMATE FINANCE 305-10. 

